| • Chief Minister, Uttar Pradesh (Fourth-time) |
| • National President, Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) |
| • Member of Uttar Pardesh Legislative Council |
| KUMARI MAYAWATI | |
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COURT ORDERS |
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IN THE HON'BLE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD. |
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| We are of the opinion that he was right in law. The breakaway MLAs must clearly claim that they are walking away from their original party also; they cannot claim that they are only walking away for, say, one particular issue or one particular voting item for the purpose of avoiding the whip; this they cannot do; if they split they must split from the party finally; they cannot split on an issue or an item and then go back to the party. This type of split the MLAs cannot put forward for saving their disqualification under paragraph 3. But if they split finally from the party even only and all by themselves without a single outside member of the original political party coming with them at that time, even then there is a split, of some size, of some tangible effect in the original political party which the Speaker cannot fail to recognize and which is quite sufficient, even by itself, for the Speaker to assume jurisdiction and to act upon. Of course one must bear in one's mind the practical consideration that a politician, who is an MLA, is not, and is not even expected to be a loner like a Judge. He will have a following, almost as if of physical necessity; when he will walk away, his group, which will certainly be sizable for a sitting MLA, will walk away with him too, almost fully, perhaps, in most cases. The decision of an MLA is the decision of a significant part of the original political party also. This is sound, practical politics. This is why, under paragraph 4 (2), two-thirds MLA's, by merging, can bring about a merger of their original political party itself, not merely, be it noted, their legislature party only! It was argued in this context that if the above argument be right, then why did Parliament in the amendment of the Constitution simply not say in paragraph 3 that the faction might arise as a result of a split in the MLA's legislature party itself? That would make the matter simple; the Speaker would only look at the breakaway MLAs; Parliament knew as well as we do that legislature party members are original party members also; if they thought that split in the legislature party was enough split in the original party by itself why did they not say so in paragraph 3? Why were the words not "?a faction, which has arisen as a result of a split in his legislature party"? Why were the words "?a faction which has arisen as a result of a split in his original political party"? The answer to this question, though perhaps not obvious immediately, is really quite simple. There cannot be any split in the legislature party because the legislature party is no party. The legislature party is a mere definition; there cannot be a split in a definition; there can only be a split in a party; the only party in issue is the original political party of the MLA from which he wishes to cross over. Therefore, the words had to be the 'original political party' and the words could not be 'legislature party'. Accordingly, it would be quite enough for the MLA's alone to walk out although here, there is certainly a lot of claim about there being office bearers and other disgruntled members with the MLAs, who are not MLAs themselves, and who were present at Darulshafa on 26.8.2003. Furthermore, the rational requirement for the claim of a big walk away group should properly and fairly be that their original political party has split; it sounds so theoretical and so redolent with horse trading when merely a claim is made that some MLAs have broken away all by themselves. Parliament could not insert in the Constitution the requirement of a claim, which is itself unnatural. The natural requirement has been inserted, if only for the purpose of making a specific claim to that effect. In these matters, concerning people in high office, even claims and surface behaviour should have respectability; this is necessary for running a State . Related to this question of split in the original party was the question of the time from when an MLA changes his original political party and his original political party becomes the breakaway faction. According to the Paragraph 3 (b), this occurs from the time of split. But the split might not be instantaneous. There might be several successive splits increasing the faction day-by-day and week-by-week. When will the MLAs belong to their new party? It is an ordinary question requiring an ordinary answer. The time of split mentioned in paragraph 3 does not and cannot refer, for a whole faction, to an instant of time only; it must refer to a width; it must refer to a period of time; the split occurs during the entirety of that period. The faction grows during the entirety of that period. When a particular MLA splits into that faction, he becomes a member of that faction. His split from his original political party takes place at an instant, that is his instant for change over of party; that instant is included in the width of time, in the total time period during which the split of the original political party has taken place. So, for the whole faction, the time of split is a period of time, but for individual breakaway MLA's the time of split is an instant, may be different for different MLA's, but all included in the faction's total time period. The third main argument related to the point of natural justice and fair hearing. The petitioners absolutely denied being given a fair hearing; they said everything was over in a jiffy; everything was over between tea time and dinner time of 6.9.2003 and this happened in spite of their filing of an earlier disqualification petition on 4.9.2003. This happened in spite of their caveat dated 5.9.2003, which showed how serious they were. Indeed the seriousness of the issue cannot be over emphasized. If the Speaker had not given a favourable decision, Shri Mulayam Singh Yadav would have been unable to demonstrate his strength, which he did just two days later, i.e. on 8.9.2003; he had been asked to demonstrate strength (within a fortnight, if I remember correctly) by the Governor as early as on 29.8.2003. Everything was waiting for this decision of the Speaker; it totally altered the power balance. Just a notice was issued to the Bahujan Dal. As a result of that Mr. Swami Prasad Maurya and Mr. Barkhu Ram Verma of the Bahujan Dal came at the hearing; they were the legislature party leader and the State President of the Dal; there is no proof that even the petition of recognition of split and the petition of recognition of merger were given to Mr. Maurya and Mr. Verma; documents were not examined; relevant documents are there, and these documents are not cursorily to be brushed aside. Mr. and Mrs. Nari's letter of being threatened to join Samajwadi Dal at gunpoint has been produced; even 3 out of the 43 MLAs claimed by Rana to have broken away, (and such claim was made on 6.9.2003 itself) even these 3 have denied that there was any meeting at Darulshafa as alleged or at all. The Speaker should have given a full hearing; if the matter could wait from 29.8.2003 to 6.9.2003, why could it not wait a few days more? Why could it not wait even overnight or one or two nights? Under the U.P. Rules of 1987 framed under paragraph 8 of the 10 th Schedule, a time of seven days is allowed under Rule 8 (3) (b) in case of a disqualification petition. True it is that in Naik (See paragraph 18) the non-compliance of Rules framed under paragraph 8 is not by itself a ground of judicial review of the Speaker's order, but is it not a factor for considering the denial of a fair hearing also? Can the Speaker issue notice only to save his own skin against an argument of breach of natural justice and as soon as somebody from other side arrives proceed like a jet plane to finish off the whole thing forever? Very great emphasis was laid on the briefest of time in which the Speaker gave his order on the petitions of 6.9.2003. Even the copy order was available to the Bahujan Dal on 9.9.2003 after the Speaker returned from Delhi; the power had by that time gone over to the Samajwadi party. Everybody had to depend on the Speaker's oral decision in the BSP, until 9.9.03 . For the respondents, the argument was that the matter was not disposed of ex-parte; an objection was raised and thereupon the genuineness of the breakaway group, their strength, their presence and their signatures were all verified. This was the most important part of the hearing; documents can do nothing. How and why the MLA's broke away is not a material point of inquiry under paragraph 3; the history of formation of the one third group is largely, if not totally, immaterial. It is the strength of the group which is all important. This strength was verified to everybody's satisfaction. There is no doubt raised about the number 37 even now; no such doubt was ever raised. In view of this, any protracted hearing, even the delay of one day was unnecessary and inexpedient. It was not, that only the strength of the Bahujan Dal was in issue; there was an issue of mid-term election; the importance of party loyalty is there, but there is the importance of political stability and avoidance of quick mid-term elections also; the interest of Bahujan Dal, Samajwadi Party and the entirety of Uttar Pradesh had to be looked after disinterestedly by the Speaker; after the formation of the qualifying breakaway faction any delay would be undesirable and could even have been dangerous, because winning back even one MLA would totally alter the situation. The importance of the decision of the Speaker was shown by immediate demonstration of strength of the Samajwadi's on 8.9.2003 and has been further shown by the stability of the Government from then until now. The stability was there then, and is the same now. The giving of a long hearing in these circumstances would not further the causes of justice and practical wisdom, but would go just in the other direction. Mr. Dwivedi relied upon several cases to show that what type of hearing is adequate and fair in the circumstances of a case varies from case to case. One has to look at the person deciding the matter; the issue which is being decided; the parties involved about whom the decision is being given; the inquiry, which is necessary to be undertaken, and many other factors. As a matter of law, the above proposition is quite right. See the cases of State Bank of Patiala, reported at 1996, 3 SCC 364 and B. Karunakar, reported at 1993, 4 SCC 727. Professor Wade is quoted at paragraph 36 in Sohan Lal Gupta's case, reported at 2003, 7 SCC 492 at page 508: "There must also have been some real prejudice to the complainant:-there is no such thing as a merely technical infringement of natural justice." In our opinion, the case of the respondents is correct and there was, in the circumstances of the case, no denial of the hearing, which was required to be given by the Speaker at the material time. Even today, nothing can be demonstrated, which, if the law which we are laying down here is right, could have persuaded the Speaker to hold differently (even less, certainly differently) on 6.9.2003. Without prejudice, without a real possibility of prejudice how can we set aside an order on the technical ground of natural justice and un-stabilize an already stable Government? There is no such thing as natural justice in the air (just as, with due acknowledgement where acknowledgement is due, since I have forgotten the name of the case and the name of the Hon'ble English Judge, who said that there is no such thing as negligence in the air). What does it matter if the copy petition of 6.9. was not given, if seven days' notice was not given, if two nights' consideration were not made, if the exact events of 26.8.2003 and of later dates upto 6.9.2003 were not scrutinized? Would such consideration and such notice reduce the number from 37 to 36? No, not as a mere notice; but it could produce alteration, by prolonging the events. If, as a notice, it cannot reduce that number, then what is the use of shedding tears over some abstract rule of natural justice being broken with regard to period of notice, consideration of documents, examination of witnesses etc. etc.? Related to the topics of hearing, procedure and the way the Speaker's decisions are to be given, there are two comparatively small points, which we wish to dispose of here and now. The first point, starts with the legal premiss that the Speaker's decision on a disqualification petition is a quasi-judicial decision and not merely an administrative one. In paragraph 94 of Kihoto , it has been laid down that it would be inappropriate to brand the jurisdiction of the Speaker or the Chairman in the 10 th Schedule as not a judicial power. The Speaker also says so in his decision of 6.9.2003. Naik lays down in paragraph 36 that where somebody claims a disqualification of an MLA under paragraph 2 of the 10 th Schedule, the burden to prove the requirements of such disqualification is upon him. These are indeed trappings of a judicial decision. By the 10 th Schedule decision of a Speaker, a right of a party is affected, directly and immediately as a result of the decision. Some proof of ingredients are necessary; usually there will be at least two sides asking for two radically different decisions. The Speaker has to apply his mind to rules and practice and not merely to a policy question. These ingredients make the decision a quasi-judicial one. Although the Speaker said in his order of 6.9. that the disqualification petition of 4.9. would require a judicial decision and therefore, he was shelving that petition for the time being, yet he went on straightaway to decide the recognition of split petition, which was tendered on 6.9.2003. The petitioners argued that if a disqualification petition requires a judicial decision, so does a recognition of split petition. The effects of both are the same-a decision on disqualification. The Speaker at least impliedly thought that the recognition petition required at least not as judicial an exercise of his power as did the decision on the disqualification petition. The petitioners argued that the Speaker was wrong in law in implying this in his decision and he misdirected himself in law in proceeding on this basis. The further argument was that on 7.9.2005 when the disqualification petition of 4.9.2003 was actually disposed of, the Speaker, (who by that time had changed and Mr. Tripathi had been replaced by Mr. Mata Prasad Pandey,) said that the 4.9. petition required no further decision since the matter had been substantially disposed of on 6.9.2003 itself. The petitioners argued that they have suffered injustice and are victims of misdirection on law. The same petition is adjourned two years ago on the ground that it required detailed consideration; then the recognition petition is considered and decided upon within a matter of a few hours; and two years later it is said that whole thing is over and what had earlier been labelled as requiring a detailed consideration had, in fact, been considered and disposed of there and then; the disqualification petition of 4.9. was kept pending as a sort of mere eye wash. There is great substance in this submission of the petitioners; they are right that the determination of the 6.9. petition implied a decision of the 4.9. petition also; they are right that the Speaker on 6.9.2003 wrongly thought that the 6.9. petition required any less quasi judicial treatment than the 4.9. petition. The petitioners are right, but their being right, does not necessarily give them any remedy or relief. The Speaker was in error in the above regard on 6.9.2003, but not every error is followed by a serious consequence, or even any consequence, in some cases. It is so in life and the world of the law but follows life. If the Speaker thought he was disposing of only the 6.9. petition only and not touching the 4.9. petition, but his substantial decision touched upon and decided both, in effect, and if he decided in accordance with fair procedure and correct direction of himself in law, then the above error is not of any result producing or fruit bearing significance. We opine that the Speaker's substantial decision is not vitiated; we cannot opine that it is vitiated merely on this side issue, which has no real bearing on the main matter. The petitioners therefore win here, but get no points. The second related topic is the submission that the Speaker merely counted members in disposing of the 6.9. petition and, though the order is long, really did nothing else. A determination of the question on paragraph 3 cannot be as low an exercise as a mere head counting one. There was no consideration of any political morality, no consideration of any justification of a split of the original party, no thought was spared as to whether the MLAs were walking away only to serve their own ends by being a part of the party which is likely to come in power in future; the whole object of Schedule 10 as mentioned in Kihoto was impliedly thought to be irrelevant by the Speaker. He just counted the numbers, 1, 2, 3?37 and he knocked down the 'auction' in favour of the respondents. This was going wholly against the sprit of the 10 th Schedule and the 3 rd paragraph. The Speaker's decision is thus vitiated. We are of the clear opinion that a mere head counting is not any lowly sort of exercise at all; the heads which are counted are not ordinary heads but those of sitting MLAs. They present themselves as the split away group after whatever consideration they think to have been necessary according to their own political wisdom. Democracy itself is a mere head counting game. How can the head counting under paragraph 3 then be branded as anything undemocratic or improper? The insertion of the 10 th Schedule might have been made for certain exalted and lofty purposes but the working of the 10 th Schedule has to be left to the practical judgement and decision of the elected MLAs. Democracy knows of no other way. The law does not permit cross-examination of MLAs on the way their hearts feel on any political decision or the course of their future political action. If they say that they are splitting and then joining with Samajwadi Party to prevent strangulation of democracy, then the Speaker cannot but believe them; nothing else is possible to do under the circumstances. This comparatively minor point of the petitioners therefore fails. The last major point of the petitioners is the one on merger. It was not pleaded in any very great detail in the petition, but only about two paragraphs mentioned the point and those two are after paragraph 30. The point is based upon paragraph 4 of the 10 th Schedule and the said paragraph is set out below:- "4 . Disqualification on ground of defection not to apply in case of merger.?( 1) A member of a House shall not be disqualified under sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 where his original political party merges with another political party and he claims that he and any other members of his original political party? (a) have become members of such other political party or, as the case may be, of a new political party formed by such merger; or (b) have not accepted the merger and opted to function as a separate group, and from the time of such merger, such other political party or new political party or group, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be political party to which he belongs for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of paragraph 2 and to be his original political party for the purposes of this sub-paragraph. (2) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) of this paragraph, the merger of the original political party of a member of a House shall be deemed to have taken place if, and only if, not less than two-thirds of the members of the legislature party concerned have agreed to such merger". The respondents claimed that they had formed the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal out of the faction, which grew out of the split in the Bahujan Dal party on 26.8.2003. They also claimed that the MLAs of the said Loktantrik Bahujan Dal unanimously decided in a meeting held on 6.9.2003 that they wanted to merge with the Samajwadi Party. This is the substance of the two petitions dated 6.9.2003, each of which is signed by 37 MLAs; one is the split petition under paragraph 3, another is the merger petition under paragraph 4. A yet separate petition was given by Rajendra Singh Rana on 6.9.2003, which was the subject of the six additional MLAs, who were claimed to have cast in their lot with the other 37. On 6.9.2003, the Speaker granted both the recognition of the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal and by another order the merger of it into the Samajwadi Party. By an order of 8.9.2003, three MLAs out of the said six moved their own application before the Speaker and confirmed what had been said by Rana on 6.9.; these three MLAs with their new petition and written confirmation were grouped by the Speaker with the other 37 in his order of 8.9.2003. The balance three out of the six did not come on 8.9.2003 and they have even filed an affidavit denying the whole case of the respondents saying that there was no meeting at Darulshafa, Lucknow at all, and therefore, nor as alleged. The respondents said that once the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal was recognized and once its "cent-percent MLAs" decided to merge with the Samajwadi Party, the Speaker had no option but to grant the merger. Even if it is argued that only 40 members of the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal out of the 43 decided to merge with the Samajwadi Party, even then under sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 4, the merger cannot be refused by the Speaker. In fact, in the merger petition, once the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal had separated from the Bahujan Dal, the members of the Bahujan Dal have no locus standi to participate; only the members of the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal are involved; the Bahujan Dal is not even entitled to any copy of the petition of the merger. The Bahujan Dal has no locus standi in the matter and cannot even raise any point about the merger in their writ petition . The petitioners say otherwise; they say that in reality the merger of the 40 MLAs is not the merger of the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal party, but the merger of some MLAs of the Bahujan Dal itself. The petition for split and the petition for merger were both dated and tendered on 6.9.2003. The time gap of formation of the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal (on 26.8.2003) and the decision to merge (on 6.9.2003) is a matter of clever pleading only, which wholly misses the substance of both the applications. The substance is that 37 or 40 MLAs of the Bahujan Dal wanted to avoid mid-term elections and wanted to make personal gains and that is why they crossed the floor over to the Samajwadi Party, absolutely contrary to paragraph 4 of the 10 th Schedule. The 40 MLAs are to be looked upon as merging from the Bahujan Dal itself. 40 is far less than two-thirds of 109. Sub-paragraph (2) of paragraph 4 requires a merger of at least two-thirds of the MLAs. This was not satisfied. Since the case was not a case of split in reality but a case of merger in reality, the fraction one-third is really immaterial; only the fraction two-thirds of paragraph 4 is material. That fraction was not reached. An attempt at merging into another political party without reaching that fraction causes the MLAs to give up their original party membership voluntarily, without affording the protection of paragraph 4. This is what has happened to all the 40 MLAs; they should have been declared as disqualified under paragraph 2. We agree that the argument certainly makes one think. By appropriately drafting two petitions, as in this case, where one-third members first claim a split and formation of a new party, and then claim a merger of the new party into another, in every case the requirement of the higher fraction of two-thirds in paragraph 4 can be rendered unenforceable and useless. It is an argument, which is very strong; the strength of the argument is shown by the fact that paragraph 3 has been removed from the Constitution with effect from the month of January, 2004. One can no longer merge with one-third strength of MLAs by merely drafting a set of double petitions properly, claiming a split of one-third as a first step and a total merger of the new split away party as the second step of the process. We ask ourselves this question that when this double petition occurred in September, 2003, what was the Speaker to do? Paragraph 3 was there just like paragraph 4. A group was entitled to split on day one, and the same group was entitled to merge on day two, under paragraph 4. From the date of the split, according to paragraph 3, the split faction becomes the original political party of the split away group both for (i) paragraph 2 (1) of the 10 th Schedule, which means the whole of the 10 th Schedule and, (ii) for paragraph 3 of the 10 th Schedule (which insertion might or might not have been made ex abundante cautela; it is not necessary for us to decide this point). If the spilt away faction becomes the new original political party as per the Constitutional definition in paragraph 3, then what can the Speaker do but allow its merger under paragraph 4 even if such merger is claimed one day later, or one minute later, or one second later than the completion of a split? The Speaker is helpless. Under paragraph (2) of paragraph 4, the necessary and sufficient condition for merger is not less than two-thirds of the members of the original legislature party to agree to such merger. After such agreement the merger cannot be further looked into by the Speaker; he has to accept it for the purpose avoiding disqualification. He did that here. We find no way of opining that the Speaker went wrong in law or that the Speaker should have adopted some other course of inquiry or reached some other decision thereby. The Speaker's hands were tied. In paragraph 4 (2), the two-thirds MLA's alone can, by themselves merging, cause a merger of the whole original party to happen. How important the MLA's are, and how, in reality, their decision is the same thing as the decision of a significant part of the whole of the original party, is quite emphatically shown by this. We want to say one thing as a note of caution in regard to recognition of the original political party. The recognition given by the Speaker to the Loktantrik Bahujan Dal under paragraph 3, is a recognition given for the purposes of the 10 th Schedule. It has relevance in regard to the further continuance of the MLAs as such until February, 2007 or so. Such recognition might be a material factor for the Election Commission if the split faction maintains its identity without immediate merger into another party, but we are not concerned with the process of election here; the Election Commissioner is concerned with the pre-election process. We are concerned with the legislative process upto the time of arrival of the next electing events. The last point is also a comparatively minor one, but it should be touched before we leave this matter finally. The petitioners argued that a disqualification petition under paragraph 2 is envisaged by the 10 th Schedule, but a mere declaratory petition under paragraph 3 or paragraph 4 is not envisaged. Somebody has to challenge the MLA's right to continue as an MLA before the Speaker can give a decision. The Speaker had a right to pronounce on the disqualification petition of 4.9.2003, but he had no jurisdiction to pronounce on the split recognition petition of 6.9.2003 or the merger petition of 6.9.2003. If somebody claimed a disqualification of an MLA, who was amongst the break away group of 40, or if somebody claimed a disqualification of any of the 40 MLA's because of their attempted merger, interpreting it as happening directly from the Bahujan Dal, only then could the Speaker consider these petitions. The 6.9. petitions are both not permissible; those are permissible only by way of defence; an MLA cannot walk away and all by himself say to the Speaker, please recognize my walking away. He remains at his own peril until somebody raises the question and he seeks to defend himself before the Speaker. We are of the opinion that this argument is not well founded. Under paragraph 6, the Speaker can decide "?if any question arises as to ?disqualification". The 6 th paragraph does not say that the question has to be raised by somebody other than the MLA who is under the possibility of disqualification himself. If any doubt about his disqualification has arisen, may be in his own mind, or in his new group, the MLA can himself raise the question about his being disqualified (or his being not disqualified, which is the same thing) and the Speaker would have to decide the matter by giving notice to the parties likely to be affected by his decision. Whether paragraph 3 is used as a shield or as a sword, depends on the facts and circumstances of the case; it is the same with paragraph 4; both the paragraphs are capable of use in both ways, i.e., both as defences to claims made and as petitions for obtaining a clear-cut decision so that the rest of the period of the Legislative Assembly might be continued by all persons concerned in a state of certainty. The obvious practical requirement also points in this direction. Though the Rules framed under paragraph 8 of the 10 th Schedule are not finally determinative, yet these Rules of U.P. also do not militate against the above view. A part of paragraph 8 of the 10 th Schedule is quoted bellows:- " 8. Rules.? (1) Subject to the provisions of sub-paragraph (2) of this paragraph, the Chairman or the Speaker of a House may make rules for giving effect to the provisions of this Schedule, and in particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing, such rules may provide for? (a) the maintenance of registers or other records as to the political parties if any, to which different members or the House belong." In 1987, under the said paragraph the Speaker framed the Members of Uttar Pradesh Legislative Assembly (Disqualification on Grounds of Defection) Rules, 1987. Rule 6 thereof requires the Secretary of the House to maintain a register in Form IV of the said Rule, which requires the following 8 items to be entered:- (i) Name of member;Significantly, there is no rule which specifically asks the Secretary to make the correction in the register once the Speaker's decision on a 10 th Schedule matter is given; but this duty of the Secretary obviously has to be implied for furtherance of the purpose of Scheduled 10, and the U.P. rules. Rule 7 states as follows: "7 (1) . No reference of any question as to whether a member has become subject to disqualification under the 10 th Schedule shall be made except by a petition in relation to such member?". Then sub-rule (2) of Rule 7 provides as follows:- "7 (2) . A petition referred to in sub-rule (1) may be made by any person in writing to the Secretary". Notably the rule does not exclude the member in question himself from making the petition; he is included in the expression "any person" occurring in Rule 7 (2) and not excluded therefrom. Under sub-rule (3) of Rule 8, the following provision is made:- "8 (3) The Speaker shall cause copies of the petition and of the annexures thereto to be forwarded:-?(b) where such member belongs to any legislature party and such petition has not been made by the leader thereof, ?to such leader,?" Thus the Rule would require a member claiming a split or a merger to present his petition to the Secretary and the Speaker would have to cause the copies of the petition to be given to the leader of the original party from which the member is splitting or seeking to come out for a merger. The notice provision also fits in with the possibility of declaratory petitions under paragraph 3 or paragraph 4. Thus the petitions on behalf of the Bahujan Dal and by the Bahujan Party members all fail, and are dismissed and the Speaker's decisions of September, 2003 and September, 2005 are all upheld, excepting that the amendment petitions of or on behalf of the Bahujan Dal are allowed for the purposes of looking at their comprehensive materials and prayers, if only for the purpose of dismissing their claims fully and comprehensively. Thus, the petitions are dismissed. We have every sympathy with the Bahujan Dal, who lost power and 40 of their MLA members in September, 2003, those members walking out through the gateway of paragraph 3 of Schedule 10 of the Constitution, which gateway itself walked out of the Constitution just four months later in January, 2004. Such are the odd things that happen in life, law and politics. No order as to costs. Dated:17/28 February, 2006 RKK/RK | ||
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